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INTRODUCTION 
For decades, the collateral source rule has been a target of tort re-
form on both state and national levels.1  The rule, which at common 
law prohibits the introduction of evidence regarding collateral pay-
ments received by the claimant in a suit for damages,2 has sparked a 
long-standing debate.  Its proponents cite its potential to align the 
costs of injury with tortfeasors and to deter tortious conduct, while its 
opponents claim that the rule results in double recovery for claimants 
and inflated insurance costs.  The result of this debate has been varied 
treatment of the rule, with some states following the common law 
rule, some limiting its application, and some abrogating it in full.3  Calls 
for tort reform have been widely influential throughout the states.  Most 
states have already limited or abrogated the rule, and it is possible that 
other states as well as the federal government may follow suit.4 
The application of the collateral source rule has become more 
complicated since the passage of the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act,5 which contains a provision establishing an individual 
mandate to obtain health insurance.6  While the insured plaintiff may 
have benefitted from the collateral source rule before the Affordable 
 
1 See, e.g., James L. Branton, The Collateral Source Rule, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 883, 887-
89 (1987); Amanda Edwards, Recent Developments, Medical Malpractice Non-Economic 
Damages Caps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEG. 213, 213-14 (2006) (explaining proposed federal 
tort reform bills that included measures to repeal the collateral source rule). 
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979) (“Payments made to or 
benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the 
tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfea-
sor is liable.”). 
3 See infra notes 21-23. 
4 See, e.g., H.R. 5, 112th Cong. § 6 (2011) (“In any health care lawsuit involving injury 
or wrongful death, any party may introduce evidence of collateral source benefits.”). 
5 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act), Pub. L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 
25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).   
6 Id. § 1501(a)–(b), 28 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(a)–(b) (West Supp. 2011), invalidated in 
part by Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 125 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted, No. 11-0398, 2011 WL 5515164 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011). 
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Care Act was passed, now an uninsured claimant may benefit under 
the rule.7  Under the common law collateral source rule, evidence that 
a plaintiff has chosen to shirk his obligation to purchase insurance 
must be excluded.8  The rule’s ban of insurance evidence may have 
the result of protecting—as opposed to penalizing—uninsured claim-
ants.  The decision to forgo insurance that may have covered the un-
insured claimants’ medical expenses is hidden from the jury, whose 
members presumably have complied with the mandate.  Under the 
new health care law, both insured and uninsured plaintiffs stand to 
gain from the use of the collateral source rule.  This outcome may 
provide an additional incentive for states and the federal government 
to limit or change the common law rule. 
Although commentators have put forth many arguments both 
supporting and opposing the use of the collateral source rule, they 
have proposed fewer models for its revision.  This Comment will pro-
vide a model for updating and partially abrogating the collateral 
source rule in personal injury cases.  It will examine the effect that the 
model will have on the outcome of these cases and the fulfillment of 
new policy goals in the wake of health care reform.  Part I will explain 
the current state of the collateral source rule and will provide an over-
view of how it has been changed across the states.  Part II will summa-
rize the debate surrounding the elimination of the rule.  Part III will 
address how the Affordable Care Act has changed this debate.  Part IV 
will evaluate the consequences of modifying the collateral source rule 
in personal injury cases.  Finally, Part V will provide a model for limit-
ing the rule. 
I.  CURRENT ROLE OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
The common law collateral source rule prohibits reducing the 
amount of damages that an injured claimant is entitled to receive 
from the tortfeasor as compensation for reasonable medical expens-
es.9  The rule therefore bars the introduction of evidence that a col-
 
7 This Comment deals solely with the Affordable Care Act as passed.  The constitu-
tionality of the individual mandate is outside the scope of this Comment, which as-
sumes that Affordable Care Act will take effect as planned on January 1, 2014, with the 
individual mandate left intact. 
8 Some versions of the collateral source rule expressly forbid the introduction of 
evidence demonstrating that the claimant lacks insurance under certain circumstanc-
es.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 411. 
9 See, e.g., Rodgers v. Boynton, 52 N.E.2d 576, 577 (Mass. 1943) (asserting that the 
only relevant “measure of damages is fair compensation for the injury sustained”); 
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lateral source, such as an insurer, paid these expenses for a claimant.10  
Though the precise definition of “collateral source” varies from state 
to state, it is generally accepted that a collateral benefit is any form of 
payment provided by a source other than the tortfeasor that repairs 
the claimant’s injury.11  These sources can include health insurance, 
automobile accident insurance, disability payments, worker’s compen-
sation, and other programs and agreements that provide or pay for 
medical or other related expenses.12  Payments made to the claimant 
by the tortfeasor, on the other hand, are admissible at trial and are 
credited to the tortfeasor in the computation of damages.13 
At trial, the collateral source rule plays both a substantive and an 
evidentiary role.14  The evidentiary function of the rule is to determine 
what evidence pertaining to collateral sources may be introduced at 
trial for the jury to consider when deciding the defendant tortfeasor’s 
liability.  That is, it governs the question of whether the fact that the 
claimant was insured can be considered in determining if the defend-
ant is at fault.  The common law collateral source rule prevents the 
defendant from presenting evidence that the claimant possessed in-
 
Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 229 P.3d 893, 899 n.8 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“The collateral source rule is the ‘well settled rule in tort actions that a party has a 
cause of action notwithstanding the payment of his loss by an insurance company.’” 
(quoting Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 640 n.4 (Wash. 1998) (en banc))), pet. granted, 
249 P.3d 624 (Wash. 2010) (unpublished table decision). 
10 As the Federal Rules of Evidence state, 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible 
upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.  
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against lia-
bility when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, 
or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. 
FED. R. EVID. 411.  Collateral sources are defined slightly differently across the states, 
but all states include medical insurance within their definitions. 
11 See, e.g., Reed v. Nat’l Council of Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 180, 
194 (D.N.H. 2010) (“[T]he rule ‘does not differentiate between the nature of the ben-
efits [paid to the claimant as a result of his injuries] so long as they did not come from 
the defendant or a person acting for him.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 920A cmt. b, at 514 (1979))).  
12 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(2)(a) (West 2005). 
13 Cf. Richard C. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 
46 MINN. L. REV. 669, 670-71 (1962) (explaining that the collateral source rule extends 
to reparations paid by sources other than the wrongdoer). 
14 See, e.g., Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Mass. 2010) (“[T]he collateral 
source rule has both a substantive aspect that relates to the law of damages, and an ev-
identiary component that governs what types of evidence may be admitted in evidence 
at trial.” (citing Goldstein v. Gontarz, 309 N.E.2d 196, 202-03 (Mass. 1974))). 
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surance to the jury before the verdict.15  Some state statutes allow the 
defendant to do so in some or all circumstances.16  The rule does not 
prevent the claimant from introducing evidence regarding his insur-
ance coverage. 
The substantive, or damages, function governs whether a claim-
ant’s damages may include expenses already covered by a collateral 
source.17  Once the jury has returned a verdict and a damages award, 
some states allow the amount the claimant received from the collat-
eral source to be subtracted from the award.18 
Every state and federal19 court has adopted the collateral source 
rule in some form.20  Presently, many states have acquiesced to the 
demands of tort reform movements by limiting the reach of the col-
 
15 Federal Rule of Evidence 411 adopts the common law prohibition on admitting 
insurance evidence to the jury. 
16 See infra note 21. 
17 See infra note 21.  The federal rule bars the introduction of evidence of collat-
eral source payments for both evidentiary and substantive purposes.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A.  But see Quintero v. United States, No. 08-1890, 2010 WL 
5071045, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (concluding that the admission of collateral 
evidence is acceptable under the Federal Rules of Evidence when substantive probative 
value outweighs prejudice).  State courts differ in their use of the collateral source 
rule.  Some ban collateral source evidence outright, some use the rule for its eviden-
tiary function during trial, and some allow collateral source information in its eviden-
tiary and substantive forms.  Compare Myers v. Beem, 712 P.2d 1092, 1093 (Colo. App. 
1985) (“[E]vidence of compensation from a collateral source is inadmissible, because 
it is irrelevant.” (citing COLO. R. EVID. 401)), with ALA. CODE § 12-21-45 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2007), and Dyet v. McKinley, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 2003) (“Evidence of 
payment by collateral sources is admissible to the court after the finder of fact has ren-
dered an award.  Such award shall be reduced by the court to the extent the award in-
cludes compensation for damages, which have been compensated independently from 
collateral sources.” (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (1990)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
18 For states that allow for the subtraction of collateral source payments from 
awards, see infra note 21, which lists states that allow for subtraction in some cases, and 
infra note 22, which lists states that allow for the subtraction in all cases.  
19 Many federal courts adhere to Federal Rule of Evidence 411 to determine the 
collateral source rule’s evidentiary role in a case.  However, they differ as to whether 
the state or federal rule should be used to compute damages.  Compare Sims v. Great 
Am. Life Ins. Co., 469 F.3d 870, 884 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Federal Rules 
of Evidence “exclusively govern in federal diversity cases”), and Craig v. F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 866 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (holding that the Alabama statute 
concerning collateral sources governs only Alabama state courts, and thus applying the 
federal rule to bar information concerning collateral sources (citing Killian v. Melser, 
792 F. Supp. 1217, 1218 (N.D. Ala. 1992))), with Shelley v. White, 711 F. Supp. 2d 
1295, 1297 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (rejecting Craig and Killian and determining that Ala-
bama’s collateral source rule applies in full to diversity cases).  
20 See infra notes 21-23. 
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lateral source rule21 or abrogating it in full.22  In some state courts,23 as 
well as in federal courts,24 the rule remains intact.  As a result of the 
 
21 Several states have modified the collateral source rule in limited circumstances 
or for certain types of cases only.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.070, 09.55.560 (2008) (al-
lowing collateral source information only post-verdict); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 
(Supp. 2008) (permitting collateral source evidence in medical malpractice cases on-
ly); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 2009) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
111.6 (1996) (post-verdict); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-225a–c (West Supp. 2009) 
(post-verdict); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (Supp. 2008) (medical malpractice on-
ly); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 2009) (post-verdict); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-
10 (Supp. 2007) (post-verdict); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1606 (Supp. 2008) (post-
verdict); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1205 (West Supp. 2009) (post-verdict); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (Supp. 2008) (post-verdict); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. § 3-2A-09 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (post-verdict); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, 
§ 60G (West Supp. 2009) (post-verdict); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303 (West 
Supp. 2009) (post-verdict); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251 (West Supp. 2008); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2007) (post-verdict); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2004) (post-
verdict); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2011) (post-verdict but preempted with re-
gard to ERISA claims); N.Y. C.P.L.R 4545 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (post-verdict); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (2010) (post-verdict); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.580 (2007) (post-
verdict); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-9-34.1 (2010) (reform applies to medical malpractice 
cases only; held unconstitutional by an unreported Superior Court opinion); S.D. COD-
IFIED LAWS § 21-3-12 (2004) (medical malpractice only); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 
(2000) (medical malpractice only); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-405 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(post-verdict in medical malpractice cases only); WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2009) (reform 
applies to medical malpractice cases only).   
 States that have limited the rule solely post-verdict have eliminated the collateral 
source rule for damages universally, allowing courts to subtract the claimant’s previous 
collateral source payment from the total award.  States that have limited the abroga-
tion of the rule to medical malpractice cases—but that have opted not to do so post-
verdict for other cases—have eliminated the collateral source rule in its damages and 
evidentiary roles only for medical malpractice actions.    
22 Several states have altered the collateral source rule in all personal injury ac-
tions as both a rule of evidence and a rule of damages.  See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-545, 12-
21-45 (LexisNexis 2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§§ 147.136, 668.14 (West 1998); MO. REV. STAT. § 490.715 (West 2010) (evidence of 
collateral payment may be presented, but not of collateral source); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2315.20 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708 (West 2004); 40 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 1303.508 (West Supp. 2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§ 41.0105 (West Supp. 2009) (Texas courts have not yet specified whether the rule ap-
plies only post-verdict); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
7B-9a (West 2010). 
23 Many states have refused to change the rule, and some courts have overturned 
modifications to the collateral source rule as unconstitutional.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-35 (2007); Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, 308 S.W.3d 135, 137 (Ark. 2009); 
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 434 S.E.2d 450, 451 n.1 (Ga. 1993); 
Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 208-09 (Kan. 2010); Leighton v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., 338 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Ky. Ct. App. 2011); Bd. of Comm’rs of Orleans 
Levee Dist. v. Mandry, 40 So. 3d 500, 502 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Cyr v. J.I. Case Co., 652 
A.2d 685, 688 (N.H. 1994); Sunnyland Farms, Inc. v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 
P.3d 324, 359 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011); Proctor v. Castalletti, 911 P.2d 853, 854 (Nev. 
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wide disparity in the application of the rule across states and federal 
courts, claimants in different courts can expect widely different out-
comes.25  Since the law remains unsettled as to whether the collateral 
source rule is procedural or substantive, the discrepancies between 
the rule in different jurisdictions promote varying outcomes in federal 
diversity cases as well.26 
The differences among state collateral source rules reflect the di-
visiveness in the debate over the need for the collateral source rule, as 
well as states’ differing reactions to numerous calls for tort reform.  
However, the academic debate over the rule has concentrated much 
more closely on the theoretical underpinnings of tort law. 
II.  TRADITIONAL DEBATE OVER THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
Originally,27 courts justified the collateral source rule as a means 
of promoting tort deterrence28 and ensuring that a defendant tortfea-
sor would not benefit from the injured claimant’s insurance cover-
 
1996); McGee v. River Region Med. Ctr., 59 So. 3d 575, 581 (Miss. 2011); Wright v. Hi-
ester Const. Co., 698 S.E.2d 822, 827 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010); Windsor Sch. Dist. v. State, 
956 A.2d 528, 542 (Vt. 2008); Miller v. Campbell Cnty., 901 P.2d 1107 (Wyo. 1995). 
Washington, D.C. also follows the common law collateral source rule.  See Snowder v. 
District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 590, 602 n.2 (D.C. 2008) (“The collateral source rule 
provides . . . that an injured party may recover full compensation damages regardless of 
the payment of any amount of those damages by an independent party . . . .”). 
24 In federal cases, courts use the common law collateral source rule.  See, e.g., Gill 
v. Maciejewski, 546 F.3d 557, 565 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen § 1983 plaintiffs seek dam-
ages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily deter-
mined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” (quoting Mem-
phis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (allowing for widely different outcomes between state and federal courts in 
§ 1983 actions).  
25 See Nora J. Pasman-Green & Ronald D. Richards, Jr., Who is Winning the Collateral 
Source Rule War?  The Battleground in the Sixth Circuit States, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 425, 430-
43 (2000) (detailing the differences between the collateral source rules of states in the 
Sixth Circuit).  
26 For divergent federal court interpretations of how the collateral source rule 
should be applied, for example, in Alabama, compare Shelley v. White, 711 F. Supp. 2d 
1295, 1297 (M.D. Ala. 2010), with Killian v. Melser, 792 F. Supp. 1217, 1218 (N.D. Ala. 
1992), and Craig v. F.W. Woolworth, 866 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (N.D. Ala. 1993). 
27 Some credit The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854), 
with the introduction of the collateral source rule to United States courts.  See, e.g., 
Pasman-Green & Richards, supra note 25, at 427 & n.16. 
28 U.S. Can Co. v. N.L.R.B., 254 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The idea behind 
the collateral-benefits doctrine, which originated in tort law, is damages measured by 
the injury are essential to deterrence.”). 
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age.29  Some scholars, including John Fleming, note that the rule was 
more applicable at the time it was adopted, given the relative unavail-
ability of collateral source coverage during the nineteenth century.30  
However, more frequently critics debate the rule’s success in promot-
ing the theory and policy of tort law.  Traditionally, there has been lit-
tle disagreement or discussion about the uninsured claimant who is 
entitled to the costs of his medical expenses from the tortfeasor be-
cause the claimant has no collateral source to cover the costs of care.  
Insurance law has not changed in any way that materially would alter 
the scope of the debate, and so the dialogue has effectively reached a 
standstill—both sides have focused almost exclusively on the value of 
allowing the insured claimant to recover from the tortfeasor despite 
the claimant’s insurance coverage.31 
Before the Affordable Care Act, the debate over the collateral 
source rule had effectively reached equilibrium with different states 
persuaded by each side.  Aside from changes in the public perception 
of the insurance industry and in the industry’s practices with regard to 
subrogation and increased coverage, the collateral source rule debate 
remained largely the same as it was decades ago.  Fundamentally, the 
disagreement about the prevalence and use of the collateral source 
rule centers on the purpose of tort law, as well as the determination of 
which party is entitled to the costs imposed by the tortfeasor and cov-
ered by the claimant’s insurance.  This Section lays out the debate 
over the collateral source rule as it stood before the Affordable Care 
Act’s passage mandated individuals’ acquisition of medical insurance 
coverage. 
A.  Arguments Supporting the Collateral Source Rule 
Proponents of the rule defend it on several grounds.  Advocates 
for the deterrent purpose of tort law are particularly protective of the 
collateral source rule.  They assert that it is fundamental to tort law for 
tortfeasors to pay for the consequences of their actions,32 and that the 
 
29 Monticello, 58 U.S. at 155 (“[T]he wrongdoer . . . is bound to make satisfaction 
for the injury he has done.”). 
30 John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1478, 1478-82 (1966). 
31 See infra note 49. 
32 See, e.g., Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 131-32 (Mass. 2010) (declaring that full 
payment by tortfeasors to claimants furthers deterrence); Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. 
v. Cleveland, 369 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (“The policy of Wisconsin’s 
tort law is to provide full compensation to persons who are injured by negligent con-
LEVENSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/15/2012  7:11 PM 
2012] Allocating the Costs of Harm 929 
deterrent effect of tort law is undermined when a claimant’s medical 
expenses are covered by his own insurance.33  Furthermore, propo-
nents argue, a tortfeasor in a personal injury action without the col-
lateral source rule should not receive a windfall of lesser or no dam-
ages because the claimant in the action received benefits from a 
collateral source.34 
 Some defend the collateral source rule because of the practical 
outcome of many personal injury cases.  They argue that collateral 
sources never pay the full costs of recovery to the plaintiff, as the costs 
of obtaining insurance, the deductible, and attorneys’ fees are often 
not reimbursed by the collateral source.35  Therefore, it is important 
that the defendant pay full damages to make up for the claimant’s 
other out-of-pocket expenses related to the injury and the consequent 
litigation.  Alternatively, the collateral source rule can be justified as a 
reward for a claimant’s investment in insurance.36  This “benefit of the 
bargain”37 argument credits the collateral source rule for providing 
 
duct and to deter such conduct by imposing the full monetary consequences on the 
tortfeasor.”  (citing Heath v. Zellmer, 151 N.W.2d 664, 674-75 (Wis. 1967))); Michael I. 
Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and Tort’s Soul, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 22 
(2009) (advocating for the collateral source rule in terms of corrective justice). 
33 See Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in America:  Abrograting the Collateral Source 
Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346, 348 (2008) (citing F. Patrick Hubbard, The 
Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 485 (2006)). 
34 Fleming, supra note 30, at 1483 (“To anyone a little troubled by the notion that 
[the rule] might mean double recovery for the plaintiff, the stereotyped response has 
been that this is still better than letting the defendant profit . . . .” (citing Gypsum Car-
riers v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525, 534 (9th Cir. 1962); Dodds v. Bucknum, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 393, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963))). 
35 See id. (“[I]n any event, the damages awarded to a plaintiff at least in personal 
actions never fully indemnify him for his loss, especially when account is taken of the 
fact that a large slice of it will find its way into the pocket of his attorney.”). 
36 See Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66 (Cal. 1970) (noting 
that the collateral source rule ensures “that a person who has invested years of insur-
ance premiums to assure his medical care . . . receives the benefits of his thrift,” while 
allowing the plaintiff’s insurance to mitigate a tortfeasor’s damages would put the 
plaintiff “in a position inferior to that of having bought no insurance, because his 
payment of premiums would have earned no benefit”). 
37 See Joel K. Jacobsen, The Collateral Source Rule and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. L. 
REV. 523, 531-34 (1991) (explaining the benefit-of-the-bargain argument in favor of 
the collateral source rule); see also Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322-23 (Va. 
2000) (“The portions of medical expenses that health care providers write off consti-
tute ‘compensation or indemnity received by a tort victim from a source collateral to 
the tortfeasor . . . .’” (quoting Schickling v. Aspinall, 369 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Va. 1988))).  
But see Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 220-21 (Kan. 2010) (rejecting 
the use of the benefit-of-the-bargain approach, as it allows privately insured claimants 
to receive write-offs for their medical expenses as part of damages while Medicare re-
cipients cannot). 
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incentives for individuals to internalize the costs of their own medical 
coverage by purchasing medical insurance.38  One way that states with 
limitations on their collateral source rules ensure that claimants re-
cover an equitable amount of damages despite the reduction for collat-
eral source benefits they receive is through make-whole rules, which en-
sure that the award is not reduced for collateral benefits until the 
claimant receives some of the costs of procuring the collateral benefit.39 
Lastly, proponents of the rule argue that the collateral source rule 
rarely results in double recovery because of the subrogation rights re-
tained in primary insurance contracts and enforced by many insur-
ance companies.40  These rights allow insurers to deduct their costs for 
the claimant’s care from the damages that the claimant receives from 
a tortfeasor if these costs are recovered in litigation.41  The insurers 
may either bring a suit against the defendant or the defendant’s in-
 
38 Christian D. Saine, Note, Preserving the Collateral Source Rule:  Modern Theories of 
Tort Law and a Proposal for Practical Application, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075, 1078 
(1997) (“Since the insurance company has already been paid premiums to bear an ac-
tuarial risk, the benefit payments it must make are simply a cost of doing business that 
has already been contracted and paid for by the plaintiff.”). 
39 Florida, for example, limits the rule in the following way: 
[T]he court shall reduce the amount of such award by the total of all amounts 
which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant . . . from all collateral 
sources . . . . Such reduction shall be offset to the extent of any amount which 
has been paid [by] the claimant . . . to secure her or his right to any collateral 
source benefit which the claimant is receiving . . . . 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 2009). 
40 See Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepard, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L. 
& ECON. 221, 231 (2007) (asserting that the collateral source rule will not lead to dou-
ble recovery because the damages are reduced only by the plaintiff’s recovery from 
other sources). 
41 See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW:  A GUIDE TO FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 3.10(a)(1) 
(student’s ed. 1988).  However, subrogation rights, or a subtraction from the award for 
collateral benefits, may be reduced to take into account a claimant’s costs, which may 
include some legal costs.  In cases of settlements, reductions may be made in propor-
tion to the reduced award accepted by the claimant.  See Neil Vidmar, Medical Malprac-
tice Lawsuits:  An Essay on Patient Interests, the Contingency Fee System, Juries, and Social Poli-
cy, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1259-60 (2005) (discussing how plaintiffs’ lawyers in 
Wisconsin negotiate agreements with insurers to limit subrogation rights so that it is 
affordable to undertake lawsuits). 
 In some cases, subrogation can result in reductions from noneconomic as well as 
economic damages because, after the legal fees and costs of the suit, the claimant’s 
economic damages may not satisfy the subrogation agreement.  See Gregory Pitts, 
Comment, E.R.I.S.A. Subrogation as Interpreted Within the Seventh Circuit—A Roadmap for 
Managing First Dollar Recovery, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 765, 769-70 (2002). 
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surer on its own behalf42 or claim a right to a portion of the claimant’s 
winnings.43  An insurer’s exercise of its subrogation rights reduces the 
claimant’s capacity for double recovery for covered costs.44 
Proponents of the collateral source rule are concerned that its 
modification or repeal would also have an effect on the independence 
of jury determinations. This group worries that juries would look un-
favorably upon insured claimants suing tortfeasors for recovery of 
costs already paid by a collateral source, regardless of whether the re-
covery would be subrogated to the insurer or retained by the claim-
ant.45  The argument follows that the collateral source rule promotes 
jury determinations independent of a potentially prejudicial inquiry as 
to whether or not the plaintiff had insurance.46 
B.  Arguments Opposing the Collateral Source Rule 
Opponents of the collateral source rule, however, reject these ar-
guments as out of touch with reality.  Stemming from a fundamental 
belief that the purpose of tort law is not deterrence47 but rather com-
pensation for harm, the central objection for opponents of the collat-
eral source rule is the possibility that claimants may recover twice for 
their injuries:  once from a primary insurer48 and again from the tort-
 
42 The insurer must return to the victim any award it receives in excess of the vic-
tim’s covered medical expenses.  STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT 
LAW 235 (1987). 
43 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.10(b)(1).   
44 See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006) (holding that 
a health insurer covered by ERISA may enforce its subrogation right). 
45 See Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform’s Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS 
L.J. 835, 861 (2002) (citing studies that suggest that juries have reacted to antitort pub-
lic relations campaigns by limiting verdicts).   
46 Id.  However, studies have shown that despite the existence of the collateral 
source rule, juries speculate on insurance in deliberations on liability and awards.  See, 
e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 
87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1875-95 (2001) (finding that conversations about insurance oc-
curred in the jury room in eighty-five percent of all cases in the study).   
47 See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law:  Does Tort Law 
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 381-87 (1994) (collecting arguments from authors 
who doubt the deterrent effect of tort liability).  
48 I refer to both first-party and liability (third-party) insurance throughout this 
Comment.  Put simply, a first-party medical insurance policy will pay some of the policy 
holder’s medical costs.  A third-party liability insurer generally pays at least some of the 
costs due to a claimant when the policyholder is found liable in the claimant’s suit 
against him. 
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feasor.49  For those opponents who view the purpose of tort law as solely 
compensatory, the collateral source rule seems to facilitate the payment 
of additional punitive damages.50  These opponents argue that subroga-
tion does not justify the use of the rule, as insurers do not always pur-
sue subrogation rights because of the expense of recovering awards.51   
Further, medical write-offs can also allow for inflated awards.  Col-
lateral sources often do not pay for medical services at full price, al-
lowing an insured claimant to receive medical care at a reduced rate.52  
Under the collateral source rule, claimants are able to collect the 
write-off—the difference between the actual cost and the reasonable 
 
49 Steven B. Hantler et al., Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 21, 26 (2005); see also Hubbard, supra note 33, at 485. 
50 See John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract Damages, 71 CALIF. L. 
REV. 56, 58-59 (1983) (arguing that justifying the collateral source rule because of its 
ability to punish the tortfeasor is incompatible with the exclusive purpose of tort law—
victim compensation—and noting that punitive damages in these cases may be re-
stricted through statutes and common law).  At least two federal circuit courts have 
rejected this rationale in the context of Federal Tort Claims Act litigation.  See Siverson 
v. United States, 710 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that this justification 
“would essentially always find recovery from a collateral source to be ‘punitive’ and ig-
nores the collateral source doctrine’s purpose of preventing a windfall to the defend-
ant”); Smith v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013, 1017 (3rd Cir. 1978) (“Were we to adopt 
the government’s position we would deprive a victim of benefits—which he has paid 
for out of his own wages—merely because he had the misfortune to have been injured 
by the United States rather than by a private tortfeasor.”). 
51 Cf. Hubbard, supra note 33, at 486 (“[S]ubrogation involves additional adminis-
trative costs because shifting the tort payment from the plaintiff to the provider entails 
time and expense as the plaintiff and provider determine the rights of the provider.” 
(citing Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 65 n.8, 67-68 (1970))). 
52 Medical bills admissible at trial do not necessarily reflect the amount paid by the 
insurer.  See Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126, 133 (Mass. 2010) (“The only patients actu-
ally paying the stated charges are the uninsured, a small fraction of medical bill 
payors.”); Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers:  Courts, Contracts, 
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 661-63 (2008) (characterizing 
the difference between rates paid by the insured and uninsured patients as “eye-
popping”); James McGrath, Overcharging the Uninsured in Hospitals:  Shifting a Greater 
Share of Uncompensated Medical Care Costs to the Federal Government, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
173, 184-85 (2007) (asserting that only the uninsured pay the hospital’s list price be-
cause insurance providers have usually negotiated discounts); see also Stanley v. Walker, 
906 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. 2009) (“The complexities of health care pricing structures 
make it difficult to determine whether the amount paid, the amount billed, or an 
amount in between represents the reasonable value of medical services.”).  The justifica-
tion for this discrepancy is that the defendant should not benefit from the deals the 
claimant’s insurer makes with its providers.  See Bozeman v. State, 879 So. 2d 692, 704 
(La. 2004) (embracing the benefit-of-the-bargain approach to allow claimants to recover 
the full value of their medical expenses, including the amount that was written off). 
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cost of the care paid by the collateral source.53  States allow claimants 
to collect write-offs under the collateral source rule because disclosure 
of the reduced payment often suggests that a collateral source paid for 
these expenses, undermining the purpose of keeping this information 
from the jury.54 
As a result of double payments and inflated awards, opponents 
blame the collateral source rule for increasing insurance payments 
and encouraging claimants to go to trial.55  This argument has led to 
the modification or abrogation of the rule in many states in response 
to calls for tort reform.56 
Until now, this debate has driven state and federal decisions to ei-
ther maintain or limit the collateral source rule.  Legislatures that 
were persuaded by the tort reform argument passed legislation limit-
ing the rule,57 whereas those for which the deterrent value of the rule 
prevails58 have retained it.59 
 
53 See, e.g., Michael K. Beard, The Impact of Changes in Health Care Provider Reim-
bursement Systems on the Recovery of Damages for Medical Expenses in Personal Injury Suits, 21 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 453, 476-77 (1998) (explaining that many courts treat write-offs as 
a collateral source benefit). 
54 See, e.g., Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1030 (Ill. 2008) (holding that a claim-
ant is entitled to the reasonable value of his medical expenses, not only those paid by 
an insurer); see also Swanson v. Brewster, 784 N.W.2d 264, 281-82 (Minn. 2010) (citing 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251, subdiv. 5 (West Supp. 2008)) (noting inadmissible evi-
dence showing that an insurer paid less than the billed amount). 
55 See, e.g., Krauss & Kidd, supra note 32, at 11-12 (noting that critics of the collat-
eral source rule argue that the rule increases both insurance premiums and litigation 
costs because it encourages needless litigation (citing Pasman-Green & Richards, supra 
note 25, at 429-30)). 
56 See supra notes 21-22; see also Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program:  
What Its Effect Would Be on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 
1339, 1341 (1994) (“As part of tort reform, the collateral source rule has by now been 
abolished in several states.”).   
57 See, e.g., Jonathan J. Lewis, Putting MICRA Under the Microscope:  The Case for Re-
pealing California Civil Code Section 3333.1(a), 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 174-78 (2001) 
(detailing California’s partial repeal of the collateral source rule in hopes of address-
ing escalating medical malpractice insurance rates in the mid-1970s). 
58 While courts have struck down many tort reform efforts as unconstitutional, 
some legislatures have managed to satisfy their courts by narrowly tailoring the rule.  
See Kara Lee Monahan, Comment, State Constitutional Law—Tort Reform—Supreme Court 
of Ohio Reverses Course and Upholds Limits on Noneconomic and Punitive Damages as Consti-
tutional, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 953, 956-60 (2009) (reviewing the history of the Ohio Su-
preme Court overturning legislative efforts on tort reform and the court’s later ac-
ceptance of noneconomic and punitive damages limitations).  The court in Arbino v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007), did not reach the issue of the consti-
tutionality of abrogating the collateral source rule, a measure that has been struck 
down by the Ohio Supreme Court multiple times.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of 
Trial Lawyers v. Sherward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1102-03 (Ohio 1999) (striking down the 
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Both sides present persuasive arguments.  Rewarding individuals 
for choosing to purchase health insurance makes sense in a world in 
which insurance is not required, yet the increasing number of defend-
ants with liability insurance seems to undermine the deterrence justifi-
cation for the rule.  Accordingly, neither side of the traditional debate 
is fully persuasive in justifying either a universal return to the collateral 
source rule or its abrogation.  However, the recent health care reform 
legislation has introduced a new issue that changes the scope and per-
suasiveness of each side of the debate:  the uninsured claimant. 
III.  INTRODUCING THE ISSUE OF THE UNINSURED CLAIMANT:  HOW THE 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE CHANGES THE SCOPE OF THE  
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE DEBATE 
The Affordable Care Act mandates the acquisition of insurance 
coverage by most Americans, and, in so doing, undermines the justifi-
cations for maintaining the collateral source rule, especially because 
the rule would now benefit uninsured individuals who shirk their ob-
ligations to obtain insurance under the Affordable Care Act.  The Af-
fordable Care Act’s purpose is to improve and extend insurance cov-
erage to nearly all Americans.60  Central to this effort is the individual 
mandate—the requirement that all nonexempt individuals obtain 
“minimum essential coverage” by 2014.61  All included individuals62 
 
repeal of the collateral source rule for violating separation of powers); Sorrell v. 
Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 510 (Ohio 1994) (striking down the repeal of the collateral 
source rule for violating the right to trial by jury), superseded by statute, 2002 Ohio Laws 
File 250. 
59 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35 (2007) (codifying the common law collateral 
source rule). 
60 The Act seeks to provide coverage for an additional thirty-two million Ameri-
cans.  See John D. Goodson, Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act:  Promise and Peril for 
Primary Care, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 742, 742 (2010); see also Scott E. Harrington, 
U.S. Health-Care Reform:  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 J. RISK & INS. 
703, 704 (2010) (listing the ways in which the Affordable Care Act will expand insur-
ance coverage “by (1) requiring individuals to obtain health insurance, (2) subsidizing 
the cost of insurance for low- and moderate-income persons, (3) requiring employers 
above a certain size to offer health coverage to employees, and (4) significantly ex-
panding eligibility for Medicaid”).  
61 Affordable Care Act sec. 1501(b), § 5000A, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b) (West Supp. 
2011) (“An applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure 
that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individu-
al, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.”). 
62 The Affordable Care Act contains exemptions for religious reasons, individuals 
not lawfully present in the United States, incarcerated individuals, and individuals who 
cannot afford insurance.  Id.  sec. 1501(b), § 5000A, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)–(e). 
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who are noncompliant with the mandate must pay a monthly penalty63 
for their failure to contribute to the system.64  This section explains the 
effect of the statute on the justifications for the collateral source rule. 
Mandated health insurance changes the collateral source rule 
equation.  Because the rule is meant in part to hide whether or not 
the claimant is insured to uphold the defendant’s liability and protect 
insured plaintiffs, the rule has less effect in an age when juries may 
well assume that the claimants have insurance.65  The insurance man-
date of the Affordable Care Act will further undermine the rule’s abil-
ity to hide a claimant’s insured status.66  If juries currently make as-
sumptions about a claimants’ coverage,67 expanded coverage under 
the Affordable Care Act will further support a jury’s assumption that a 
claimant is insured. 
A weightier concern is that now not only is it controversial for in-
sured claimants to recover full damages for their losses despite their 
coverage, but also, under the Affordable Care Act, willfully uninsured 
claimants68 would receive full damages despite their failure to opt in to 
a mandatory insurance system that could have mitigated the damages 
that the tortfeasor would have to pay.  As passed, the Affordable Care 
Act imposes a penalty on willfully uninsured individuals, illustrating 
that it intends the individual procurement of medical insurance cov-
erage to be required.  The mandate is a conscious effort to spread 
 
63 Id. sec. 10106(b)(1), § 5000A, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(b) (“If a taxpayer who is an 
applicable individual . . . fails to meet the requirement of [maintaining minimum es-
sential coverage] . . . , there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with respect 
to such failures . . . .”).   
64 In addition to aligning the collateral source rule with the Affordable Care Act’s 
philosophy, changing the collateral source rule may act as an enhanced deterrent for 
individuals to shirk their responsibility under the individual mandate.  
65 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
66 It is estimated that between twenty-one and twenty-three million people, includ-
ing illegal immigrants, will remain uninsured under the Affordable Care Act.  See Har-
rington, supra note 60, at 704 n.2; Mitchell H. Katz, Future of the Safety Net Under Health 
Reform, 304 JAMA 679, 679 (citing Office of the Actuary, Cntrs. for Medicare & Medi-
caid Services estimate).  It is projected that about four million nonelderly people will 
remain willfully uninsured in 2016.  Harrington, supra note 60, at 704 n.2. 
67 See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 46, at 1889 (contrasting concerns with over-
compensating plaintiffs with “traditional assumptions about the role of insurance in 
juror thinking”). 
68 I use “willfully uninsured” to distinguish those who ignore the Affordable Care 
Act mandate from individuals who are exempt from obtaining coverage under the 
statute.  See supra note 62.  For the purpose of this Comment, “willfully uninsured” re-
fers to individuals who have the obligation to obtain coverage but refuse to do so.  
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costs among individuals to reduce premiums and health care costs.69  
Willfully uninsured individuals subvert this purpose. 
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the collateral source 
rule allows willfully uninsured claimants to hide their lack of health 
coverage during trial and during the calculation of damages.  Though 
proponents of the rule argue that a defendant should not benefit 
from a claimant’s decision to purchase insurance,70 the states and the 
federal government may decide that because purchasing insurance is 
now mandatory, rewarding the decision is less important.  In addition, 
rewarding willfully uninsured claimants with full damages for their 
decisions to forgo coverage is less justifiable. 
Thus, the collateral source rule is less defensible as applied to ei-
ther insured or willfully uninsured plaintiffs.  The Affordable Care Act 
provides an additional and substantial reason to favor changing the 
rule.  Updating the collateral source rule to align with the goals of the 
Affordable Care Act—specifically to dissuade individuals from refus-
ing to obtain insurance coverage and to ensure that willfully unin-
sured individuals do not receive damages that an insurance plan oth-
erwise would have covered—reinforces the Affordable Care Act’s 
message and provides an opportunity for tort reform consistent with 
the Act.  This measure may have the effect of providing an additional 
deterrent to nonexempt individuals deciding to forgo health insur-
ance coverage.  At the very least, the new issue of the uninsured 
claimant changes the weight of the arguments fundamental to the 
traditional collateral source rule debate. 
IV.  THE EFFECT OF MODIFYING THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE  
IN THE WAKE OF HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM 
In light of the Affordable Care Act, arguments for upholding the 
common law collateral source rule are no longer as persuasive as they 
were before.  Whether or not changes to the collateral source rule will 
be made in the wake of the Affordable Care Act will vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction.  However, to evaluate this choice and determine 
how the rule should be changed, a number of factors must be consid-
ered to evaluate the effect that such a limitation may have on the ex-
isting tort regime.  This Part highlights a number of these factors and 
 
69 See infra note 84. 
70 See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 751 (Ariz. 1977) (offering a ra-
tionale for the collateral source rule). 
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evaluates the consequences that changes to the collateral source rule 
may have for each. 
A.  Political Benefits 
Long a target of calls for tort reform, critics often blame the col-
lateral source rule for driving up insurance costs as well as the costs of 
both litigation and settlement.71  Limiting the collateral source rule’s 
application in certain circumstances may be a low-cost means of pleas-
ing big businesses, people in the medical profession, individuals who 
purchase their own liability insurance coverage, and others who are 
looking for government intervention to reduce premiums.72  On the 
federal level, a limited abrogation of the collateral source rule meant 
to decrease damages in connection with the Affordable Care Act may 
produce some goodwill from groups who are more likely to oppose 
the mandate, while also promoting the policy objective of incentiviz-
ing individuals to purchase coverage.  However, it does not make 
good political sense to eliminate the rule outright.  Collateral source 
rule statutes must have protections for those exempt from the indi-
vidual mandate, those subject to mandatory subrogation agreements, 
and those who otherwise would be denied a sufficient recovery.  The 
following Sections will lay out what these protections should be. 
B.  Purpose of Tort Law 
At the core of the debate over the collateral source rule is a theo-
retical argument about the purpose of tort law.  Those who favor de-
 
71 See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, An Insurance-Based Compensation System for Product-
Related Injuries, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 669, 709 (1997) (“To the extent that victims are 
compensated twice, these additional payments are passed on to the public in the form 
of higher insurance costs.” (citing John L. Antracoli, Note, California’s Collateral Source 
Rule and Plaintiff’s Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 671 (1986))); 
Victor E. Schwartz, Essay, Tort Law Reform:  Strict Liability and the Collateral Source Rule Do 
Not Mix, 39 VAND. L. REV. 569, 573-74 (1986) (“When the tort system distributes a previ-
ously compensated-for risk, it, in effect, redistributes the risk to a different insurance sys-
tem.  This redistribution makes poor economic sense . . . . [I]t is far easier to return pre-
mium dollars to injured parties through accident and health insurance.”). 
72 Whether or not these reforms have a meaningful effect on cutting the costs of 
litigation, the number of suits brought, or premium prices is subject to wide debate.  See, 
e.g., Alexee Deep Conroy, Lessons Learned from the “Laboratories of Democracy”:  A Critique of 
Federal Medical Liability Reform, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1185-86 (2006) (citing studies 
that present varied conclusions on the effect of repealing the collateral source rule). 
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terrence73 are more likely to sympathize with the application of the 
collateral source rule,74 while those who favor a compensatory ap-
proach75 seek the rule’s limitation.76 
When a state limits the collateral source rule, it supports the view 
that the primary purpose of the tort system is to compensate a victim 
for his loss.77  At first glance, the total abrogation of the collateral 
source rule would seem to advance this purpose, so that juries may 
award economic damages78 based solely upon the claimant’s demon-
stration of uncompensated loss.79  However, some proponents of the 
compensation theory of torts agree that the collateral source rule does 
play a role in allocating to the claimant the costs of obtaining insur-
ance, attorneys’ fees, and the deductible—costs that the tortfeasor has 
theoretically imposed that otherwise may not be awarded to the 
claimant.80  For this reason, some states that have abrogated the col-
lateral source rule include make-whole provisions allowing the claim-
ant to recover some of these costs before the collateral benefits are 
subtracted from the award.81 
Proponents of the compensatory theory of tort law may also take 
issue with a modification of damages awards that would deny willfully 
uninsured claimants the full cost of their injuries, failing to make the 
claimant whole.  However, perhaps this outcome is justifiable.  Under 
the Affordable Care Act, those who refuse to purchase insurance pay a 
 
73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (“[One of] the purposes for 
which actions of tort are maintainable [is] . . . to punish wrongdoers and deter wrong-
ful conduct . . . .”).  
74 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (explaining that tort damages are 
meant “to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms”).   
76 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
77 See generally Fleming, supra note 50 (advancing the view that the tort system 
should function solely to compensate claimants for their losses). 
78 The claimant’s award should only be reduced for economic damages covered by 
insurance, as this is the portion of the award for which double recovery is possible.  
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.11(d). 
79 Cf. IDAHO CODE ANN § 6-1606 (Supp. 2008) (“In any action for personal injury 
or property damage, a judgment may be entered for the claimant only for damages 
which exceed amounts received by the claimant from collateral sources . . . .”). 
80 See Fleming, supra note 50, at 59 (“The Helfend court considered that the collat-
eral source rule . . . also performed a ‘legitimate and even indispensible function’ by 
compensating for the plaintiff’s attorney’s share in the recovery . . . . [A] plaintiff does 
not really receive a double recovery, because he must pay his own attorney a substantial 
percentage of the damages awarded.” (quoting Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 
465 P.2d 61, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970))). 
81 See supra note 39. 
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penalty equal to the lesser of a cash amount82 and the insurance pre-
mium for the lowest level of “minimum acceptable coverage,” the 
bronze plan.83  Anyone who pays less than the premium for minimum 
essential coverage may be enriched by the failure to purchase health 
insurance.  Such nonparticipants also cause a loss to the public by fail-
ing to contribute to the national insurance fund used to reduce the 
costs of insurance for all.84  If the purpose of the Affordable Care Act 
is to build such a fund, for which all of society pays to ensure lower-
priced coverage for those who are harmed, then limiting the collateral 
source rule may be justified as a means to encourage cost spreading 
and to efficiently compensate those who are harmed for their loss, 
which would promote the goal of compensation.85 
From a deterrence perspective, changing the collateral source 
rule would undermine its important purpose—ensuring that tortfea-
sors pay for the harm they cause.86  The deterrence argument against 
limiting the common law collateral source rule contends that defend-
ant tortfeasors will not be made to pay for the harm they have caused 
if the claimant’s primary insurer covers his medical expenses.  Propo-
nents of deterrence would likely disagree with changes to the collat-
eral source rule that reduce the liability of defendant tortfeasors to 
uninsured claimants, unless it could be proven that this measure has 
an offsetting deterrence benefit.  A measure that accounts for willfully 
uninsured plaintiffs in awarding damages should strike a balance be-
 
82 In 2014, this cash amount will be $95, multiplied by a cost-of-living adjustment; 
in 2015, $325; and in 2016, $695.  Affordable Care Act, sec. 1501(b), 10106(b)(3), 
§ 5000A, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(3) (West Supp. 2011); Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), § 1002(a)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A. 
83 Insurance plans meeting the “minimum essential coverage” requirement are 
placed into four categories specifying levels of coverage:  bronze, silver, gold, and plat-
inum.  Affordable Care Act § 1302(d)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(d)(1).  The calculation 
of the penalty amount is based on a comparison between the cash amount and premi-
ums for a bronze level plan.  Id. sec. 1501(b), 10106(b)(2), § 5000A(c), 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A(c)(1)(B); HCERA § 1002, 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(c)(1)(B). 
84 As the theory behind the Affordable Care Act is to decrease insurance premi-
ums for individuals and small groups by grouping people together, a willful nonpartic-
ipant theoretically causes a societal loss as well.  See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, A “Broader 
Regulatory Scheme”—The Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1881, 1881-82 (2010) (explaining the centrality of the individual mandate to the Af-
fordable Care Act’s objective of fighting the adverse selection problem by inserting 
healthy individuals into the insurance pool to stabilize costs). 
85 For an overview of the theory and justifications behind cost spreading, see Gui-
do Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 
517-19 (1961). 
86 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.14 (3d ed. 1986); 
SHAVELL, supra note 42, at 21-32 (1987); Calabresi, supra note 85, at 502. 
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tween deterring individuals from shirking their responsibilities under 
the individual mandate87 and upholding fair and reasonable awards 
for claimants through both the make-whole rule and subrogation for 
insurers.  The result would be that tortfeasors still pay for their behav-
ior. 
Under a system without the collateral source rule, the tortfeasor’s 
liability may be reduced to reflect the economic damages paid by the 
claimant’s insurer, but the tortfeasor will still be responsible for non-
economic damages and expenses not paid by insurance.88  In practice, 
however, although the tortfeasor is theoretically liable for damages 
awarded to the claimant, more frequently the defendant’s liability in-
surance covers them.89  This insurance payment strips the defendant 
of most of the responsibility for paying the claimant’s damages, with 
the exception of damages awarded beyond the defendant’s coverage, 
the defendant’s deductible, and consequently higher premiums.90 
Eliminating the collateral source rule for insured claimants also 
creates a problem from a deterrence perspective, as a system that de-
ducts collateral source payments from damages awards fails to hold 
the defendant responsible for the full extent of the harm he caused.  
To mitigate this problem, I analyze a damages award regime that 
promotes subrogation.  Allowing for subrogation ensures that the de-
fendant tortfeasor is liable for the amount otherwise subtracted from 
the claimant’s award.  Promoting subrogation for insured claimants, 
discussed below,91 may help to ease the tension between the compen-
satory and deterrence justifications for retaining and changing the 
collateral source rule. 
C.  The Collateral Source Rule as a Rule of Damages  
Versus a Rule of Evidence 
A proposal to modify the collateral source rule to align with the 
Affordable Care Act’s goals must address the collateral source rule’s 
 
87 See supra text accompanying notes 61 and 63. 
88 See supra note 78. 
89 See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 50, at 59; cf. Steven W. Pottier & Robert C. Witt, On 
the Demand for Liability Insurance:  An Insurance Economics Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1681, 1688 (1994) (“[I]nsurance reduces the incentives of the insured and potential 
victims to avoid accidents.”). 
90 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 316-17 (1990) (detailing the ways in which covered defendants 
may still be responsible for out-of-pocket payments for a claimant’s damages if the 
damages exceed a predetermined cap).  
91 See infra Section IV.D. 
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role as both a rule of evidence and a rule of damages.  Some states 
have abrogated the collateral source rule as a rule of evidence, allow-
ing defendant tortfeasors to present evidence of the claimant’s insur-
ance coverage or lack thereof to the jury.92  However, even in states 
that have made this change, it is unclear how a jury charged with de-
ciding a defendant’s liability should consider insurance information.93  
Jurors who have complied with their obligation to purchase insurance 
likely will be prejudiced against a claimant who failed to obtain insur-
ance.94  This prejudice may cause willfully uninsured claimants to re-
cover much less in damages than is reasonable—less than the claimant 
would have received without the collateral source rule had he been 
insured.  The purpose of changing the collateral source rule after the 
Affordable Care Act should not be to deny all damages to willfully un-
insured claimants, but to align the rule’s outcome with the underlying 
goal of the individual mandate:  to facilitate spreading the costs of in-
jury and illness, and not to compensate an individual for medical cov-
erage he refused to obtain in violation of the Affordable Care Act. 
In addition, because all willfully uninsured claimants are equally 
at fault for their failure to purchase minimum essential coverage, it 
would be unjust to hinge the claimant’s award on the jury’s prejudice 
against a claimant’s failure to obtain insurance.  For these reasons, the 
modifications to the collateral source rule proposed here leave the 
rule’s evidentiary function intact. 
Introducing insurance evidence after the verdict does not create 
the same subjectivity and prejudice as during trial.  In many states, 
judges are charged with reducing the award post-verdict based on evi-
dence of collateral source benefits paid to the claimant that is pre-
sented after trial.95  There are at least three benefits to reducing 
awards during the damages phase of the trial.  First, evidence of col-
lateral payments or the lack thereof does not have the same relevance 
problem post-trial as it does during the trial.  Second, the modifica-
 
92 See supra note 22. 
93 Cf. Killian v. Melser, 792 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (noting that put-
ting insurance evidence to the jury was “irrelevant and prejudicial . . . having nothing 
whatsoever to do with the true calculation of the possible recoverable damages”). 
94 See, e.g., Danielle A. Daigle, Commentary, The Collateral Source Rule in Alabama:  A 
Practical Approach to Future Application of the Statutes Abrogating the Doctrine, 53 ALA. L. 
REV. 1249, 1257-58 (2002) (observing that federal district courts in Alabama have 
reached differing decisions as to how to use collateral evidence because of jurors’ likely 
prejudice). 
95 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308(3) (2007) (describing the process for re-
ducing the claimant’s award by the amount of the collateral source payments received). 
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tion of the collateral source rule’s damages function may be much less 
unpredictable than total abrogation because judges can make objec-
tive deductions instead of juries making subjective calculations.  
Third, the rule prevents possible prejudice against claimants based on 
their lack of insurance coverage.  However, such a rule would have to 
protect not only the willfully uninsured claimant from jury prejudice.  
Two other groups—insured claimants subject to subrogation agree-
ments and uninsured claimants exempt from obtaining insurance—
must be considered in order to construct a damages rule that fairly al-
locates awards. 
D.  Subrogation 
Commentators often acknowledge that the collateral source rule 
would be easily reconcilable with a compensatory theory of torts if it 
consistently supported subrogation,96 a contractual arrangement 
through which a claimant’s primary insurer is reimbursed for its cov-
erage of the claimant’s medical costs if the claimant recovers these 
costs from the tortfeasor.97  Subrogation benefits both the insurers and 
the insureds:  insurers receive reimbursement for medical costs they 
cover when their insureds are victims of a tort, and insureds who opt 
into subrogation arrangements can benefit from lower premiums.98 
Decreasing premiums by way of subrogation agreements furthers 
the policy of the Affordable Care Act by driving down insurance costs.  
In fact, health plans using federal money to provide individual health 
insurance must pursue subrogation from liable third parties by “all 
reasonable measures.”99 
States considering changes to their collateral source rules as well 
as states that have changed the rule already should consider the bene-
fits of subrogation.  However, subrogation poses two problems that 
 
96 Subrogation often follows twin ideals:  (1) a tortfeasor does not benefit from a 
collateral source while the plaintiff is not overcompensated, and (2) the plaintiff does 
not receive a windfall because of the obligation to reimburse the collateral source.  See 
Fleming, supra note 50, at 57-58. 
97 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.10(a)(1).  The claimant’s insurer can 
also recover these costs in an action against the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s insurer. 
98 Individuals will prefer insurance contracts with subrogation agreements because 
they will prefer lower-cost full coverage plans to plans that cost more for the exclusion 
of a subrogation right, and because individuals seeking to profit from arrangements 
without subrogation obligations can drive up premiums for plans with subrogation 
rights.  See SHAVELL, supra note 42, at 236-37. 
99 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (2006). 
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limit the efficacy of the arrangement.100  The first problem is the cost 
for insurance providers to exercise their subrogation rights.101  Yet in-
surance companies often succeed in their subrogation claims,102 illus-
trating that while costs of subrogation may be high, they are not pro-
hibitive.  While policymakers may consider increasing the efficiency of 
the suit for subrogation, the problem by itself does not merit a change 
in the collateral source rule.103 
More seriously, subrogation affects an insured claimant’s award, a 
problem that should prompt a revision of the collateral source rule.  
In some personal injury actions, successful claimants may find that 
their awards are small after insurance setoffs to cover the costs of ob-
taining insurance, attorneys’ fees, and noneconomic damages.104  
Some claimants, after cooperating with a subrogation agreement, may 
 
100 First, while subrogation has been credited with making lower premiums possi-
ble, the fact that insurance companies receive refunds pursuant to subrogation con-
tracts does not always result in the reduction of costs and premiums.  Though many 
individuals are given the choice of lower premiums in exchange for a subrogation 
agreement, these lower premiums may not reflect the true extent of insurance compa-
ny savings.  Second, subrogation may present a problem for third-party liability insur-
ance premiums, which may increase as a result of larger awards to claimants that are in 
part subrogated to the first-party insurer.  For this reason, some state collateral source 
statutes limit subrogation in certain circumstances.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12-565(C) (Supp. 2008).  Decreasing awards for willfully uninsured claimants and 
insured claimants without subrogation agreements may not fully offset the increased 
costs from newly insured claimants with subrogation agreements.  However, this out-
come is still preferable to the current system because it allocates the payment for harm 
to the tortfeasor, as opposed to the claimant’s insurer.  Rather than resulting in the 
tortfeasor paying full damages directly, this situation may cause him to pay indirectly in 
the form of increased liability insurance premiums. 
101 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM:  EVIDENCE 
FROM THE STATES 6 n.15 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/ 
doc5549/Report.pdf (explaining that many insurers do not exercise their rights to 
subrogation because “it can be difficult to establish that a certain award covers the 
same damages as the injury covered by an insurance benefit,” because of the substan-
tial administrative costs involved in obtaining awards, and because of possible “ill will 
among customers”).  
102 See, e.g., DeHerrera v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 219 P.3d 346, 350 (Colo. App. 
2009) (holding that the insurer had a right of subrogation for payments it made to the 
insured’s medical providers); Estate of Risk v. Risk, 771 N.W.2d 653 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) 
(unpublished table decision) (holding that a workers’ compensation insurance company 
had a subrogation right to benefits paid to a widow for her husband’s injuries). 
103 Evaluating the extent of this problem is difficult; most authors writing about 
the subject do not show the rate at which insurers exercise their subrogation rights fol-
lowing successful personal injury suits. 
104 See, e.g., Michelle Andrews, Adding Insult to Injury, SMARTMONEY, July 1, 2000, at 
130 (highlighting stories of severely injured claimants whose pain and suffering dam-
ages were significantly reduced for subrogation costs). 
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not have the funds to cover the costs of obtaining the subrogated 
damages.  This lack of funds has contributed to the development of 
setoff rules, which limit how awards are reduced post-verdict.  One of 
these setoff options, the make-whole rule, ensures that a claimant’s 
award is not reduced for collateral benefits before the claimant recov-
ers some of the costs of procuring the collateral benefit.105  The make-
whole rule can limit the burden of a subrogation obligation because it 
can restrict an insurer’s exercise of subrogation rights until the claim-
ant has been fully compensated for losses the insurer did not cover.106  
Although the make-whole rule does not guarantee full compensation 
for the plaintiff’s costs,107 it aims to ensure that the claimant does not 
lose more than he gains from the suit.108  The rule takes into account 
the real costs of personal injury litigation:  attorneys’ fees, costs of ob-
taining insurance, and so on.109 
While some courts have adopted the make-whole rule,110 a number 
of states have statutory provisions that prioritize compensation of the 
plaintiff’s costs of obtaining the judgment over both deductions for 
the defendant and for the plaintiff’s insurer.111  For example, the 
Connecticut collateral source statute requires that the court reduce 
 
105 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 2009) (“[T]he court shall reduce 
the . . . award by the . . . amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant 
. . . from all collateral sources. . . . Such reduction shall be offset to the extent of any 
amount which has been paid . . . [by] the claimant . . . to secure [the] right to any col-
lateral source benefit which the claimant is receiving as a result of her or his injury.”). 
106 See Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers of Cal., 64 F.3d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“It is a general equitable principle of insurance law that, absent an agreement to the 
contrary, an insurance company may not enforce a right to subrogation until the in-
sured has been fully compensated for her injuries, that is, has been made whole.”). 
107 Most make-whole provisions account for the cost of obtaining the collateral 
source benefit but do not necessarily account for attorneys’ fees, although these fees 
are sometimes considered unofficially. 
108 See Roger M. Baron, Subrogation:  A Pandora’s Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. 
REV. 237, 249-52 (1996) (explaining the make-whole doctrine as a means of easing the 
effect of subrogation on claimants); see also David M. Kono, Note & Comment, Unravel-
ing the Lining of ERISA Health Insurer Pockets—A Vote for National Federal Common Law 
Adoption of the Make Whole Doctrine, 2000 BYU L. REV. 427, 449-50 (analyzing the doc-
trine in light of ERISA concerns). 
109 In a post–Affordable Care Act regime, the cost of obtaining insurance should 
not be taken into account because the individual mandate requires that everyone ob-
tain insurance coverage.  The costs of a deductible, however, should be considered. 
110 See, e.g., Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W. 2d 348, 355-56 
(Wisc. 1982); cf. Cutting v. Jerome Foods, Inc., 993 F.2d 1293, 1297-98 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(evaluating, without deciding, whether the make-whole rule should be applied in fed-
eral court). 
111 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West Supp. 2009) (declaring no reduction of 
award for collateral sources for which a subrogation right exists). 
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the award by the amount of benefits the claimant received from col-
lateral sources.112  However, the statute specifies that the amount the 
claimant has paid to secure insurance will be removed from the re-
duction, therefore ensuring that the claimant is adequately reim-
bursed for the costs of insurance.113 
A second and less common means of easing the effects of subroga-
tion is the common fund.  The common fund requires that where a 
party to litigation receives an award, others sharing the award must 
bear a portion of the cost of obtaining it, including a reasonable 
amount of attorneys’ fees.114  In the context of insurance contracts, 
some courts require this kind of fee-sharing for insurers that do not 
exercise their rights to intervene or join with the claimant in personal 
injury cases115 but stand to gain from a claimant’s recovery in the 
case.116  This equitable form of recovery allows claimants to be com-
pensated for harms not covered by collateral benefits without losing 
the entire award to attorneys’ fees and subrogation.117  The common 
fund is also credited with increasing efficiency in the long run.  The 
fund encourages cost sharing between the claimant and the insurer, 
whether by means of mounting a joint case, or by sharing the cost of 
attorneys’ fees in a successful case.118 
 
112 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a(a) (West Supp. 2009).  
113 Id. 
114 See Johnny Parker, The Common Fund Doctrine:  Coming of Age in the Law of Insur-
ance Subrogation, 31 IND. L. REV. 313, 321 (1998) (quoting Means v. Montana Power 
Co., 625 P.2d 32, 37 (Mont. 1981), which described the purpose of the common fund 
doctrine as avoiding unjust enrichment). 
115 See id. at 328 (explaining the options available to an insurer with claims against 
a tortfeasor). 
116 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 
398, 402 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that without the common fund the claimant 
would be in a worse position after her settlement than if she had not brought suit). In 
Mathews v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., the court held: 
[W]here [the insured’s attorney] effects a recovery it is only fair that the in-
surance company pay a reasonable attorney fee on its part of the recovery.  
How in the name of fairness can it be said that the injured should pay a fee 
not only on his recovery but also on the recovery of the insurance company? 
690 F. Supp. 984, 987 (M.D. Ala. 1988.  See also Eiland v. Meherin, 854 So.2d 1134, 
1137 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) (following Mathews to avoid a “manifestly unjust result”). 
117 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 213 F.3d at 402 (explaining an insurance plan in which 
the common fund rule allowed the claimant to recover damages not explicitly covered 
by the plan). 
118 Cf. id. (concluding that attorneys’ fees would likely make existing plans worse 
in the long run).   
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A system with a limited collateral source rule needs strict set-off 
rules such as the make-whole rule or the common-fund rule if the goal 
is to ensure that victims have incentives to seek damages for their loss-
es.  An updated statute would need to ensure that claimants bringing 
successful claims would not be worse off than they would have been 
had they not brought suit at all.119  In cases with a jury unsympathetic 
to reimbursing an insurance company, juries may award the claimant 
less than full economic damages.120  This outcome is especially likely 
where a claimant sues a sympathetic defendant or where his award is 
reduced for comparative negligence.121  A collateral source statute, 
particularly one that limits the rule, should incorporate some safe-
guards for claimants obligated to subrogate a portion of their dam-
ages.  Such safeguards are also beneficial to insurance companies that 
would have to spend their own resources to recover the insured’s col-
lateral payments if the insured had no incentive to sue for damages.  
No state collateral source statutes currently adopt the common fund 
doctrine, which courts enforce as a rule of equity.  As stated above, 
though, some states do adopt rules that incorporate the make-whole 
rule.122  The make-whole rule may be more effective as a direct and ef-
ficient way for the court to protect the claimant’s award, as opposed to 
the common fund rule, which requires the court to collaborate with 
the insurer to ensure the payment of the insurer’s portion of the costs 
of the suit. 
In addition, many states with modified collateral source rules 
make special provisions for individuals whose insurance coverage in-
cludes a subrogation agreement.123  While some states allow for the in-
troduction of evidence regarding a claimant’s subrogation agreements 
to counter the defense’s introduction of evidence of the claimant’s 
collateral benefits,124 others have limited the rule to preserve collat-
 
119 See, e.g., id. at 402 (ruling that a system that leaves the claimant worse off than 
had she not sued would “gratuitously deter the exercise of the tort rights”). 
120 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.10(c) (explaining jury members’ pos-
sible prejudice against insurance companies trying to recover the cost of providing col-
lateral benefits to an injured party from a tortfeasor). 
121 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 213 F.3d at 404 (reducing claimant’s award by twenty-
five percent for comparative negligence). 
122 See, e.g., supra notes 111-12.  
123 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-545(c) (LexisNexis 2005) (“Upon proof by the plain-
tiff to the court that the plaintiff is obligated to repay the medical or hospital expenses 
which have been or will be paid or reimbursed, evidence relating to such reimburse-
ment or payment shall be admissible.”). 
124 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225(a) (West Supp. 2009) (allowing for 
post-verdict reduction of damages by the amount the claimant received from collateral 
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eral-source-rule protection for sources with a subrogation right.125  Os-
tensibly, states have adopted this standard out of concern that claim-
ants who have received collateral benefits may be less likely to receive 
full awards from juries, even if they present evidence of their subroga-
tion obligations.126  For this reason, some claimants may prefer to hide 
all evidence of their insurance coverage from the jury.  Conversely, in 
states where claimants may present evidence of subrogation obliga-
tions to counter evidence of collateral benefits, the jury may deter-
mine more accurately the amount of money the claimant will receive 
from the suit and the award needed to make the claimant whole.127  In 
a world after the Affordable Care Act, where juries will likely presume 
that claimants are insured, claimants should be able to decide for 
themselves whether information regarding subrogation agreements is 
beneficial or harmful.  Specifically, claimants should be able to de-
termine whether the jury is more likely to award full damages if it 
knows that the claimant is insured but obligated to repay the insurer, 
or if it does not know whether the claimant is insured.  Once the court 
has decided that a valid subrogation right exists, the choice of wheth-
er or not to inform the jury of the collateral benefit should be the 
claimant’s.  Retaining the collateral source rule for claimants with 
subrogation obligations aligns with the interest of insurers.  Claimants 
are likely to choose the course that yields awards from which they can 
benefit, a choice from which the insurer will benefit as well, allowing 
for compensation, deterrence, and perhaps lower premiums. 
E.  Exemptions 
Aside from claimants legally bound to subrogation agreements 
with their insurers, other groups may be unfairly affected by modifica-
tions to the collateral source rule.  A collateral source statute should 
 
sources except where “a right of subrogation exists”); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-
1205(2) (West Supp. 2009) (“Such reduction shall not apply to the extent that there is a 
right of recoupment through subrogation . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (same). 
125 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (2008) (“[A] defendant may introduce evi-
dence of amounts received or to be received by the claimant as compensation for the 
same injury from collateral sources that do not have a right of subrogation by law or 
contract.”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (McKinney Supp. 2011) (“[E]vidence shall be admissi-
ble for consideration by the court to establish that any such past or future cost or ex-
pense was or will, with reasonable certainty, be replaced or indemnified . . . from any 
collateral source . . . .”). 
126 See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 41, § 3.10(c) (discussing the possibility of ju-
ror prejudice against insurance companies). 
127  See Pitts, supra note 41, at 769-70. 
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take into account individuals exempt from the requirement to obtain 
health insurance under the Affordable Care Act.128  The statute speci-
fies a number of exempt groups, including individuals who cannot af-
ford health coverage.129  These exempt groups should not be exposed 
to jury criticism or given reduced awards for not obtaining coverage.  
For some in these groups, lawsuits may be the only means by which 
they can pay for their medical costs, as opposed to willfully uninsured 
individuals, who are able to obtain health insurance but refuse to do 
so.130  For these reasons, like individuals whose insurance contracts re-
serve subrogation rights, exempt individuals should have the discre-
tion to determine whether evidence of their uninsured status should 
be revealed to the factfinder. 
V.  PROPOSING MODIFICATIONS TO THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
Accounting for the numerous issues raised by changing the rule, I 
propose below a model statute for changing the common law collat-
eral source rule—based both on preexisting state statutes131 amending 
the rule and on new policy objectives that the Affordable Care Act 
raises.  This Part first lays out the objectives that this new regime is 
meant to achieve.  It then provides language for a model damages 
statute modifying the collateral source rule and adding an additional 
damages rule to account for the uninsured plaintiff.  Finally, it ad-
dresses some of the criticisms that may be raised against the proposal. 
A.  Objectives of Modifying the Collateral Source Rule 
Any changes modifying the collateral source rule after the Afford-
able Care Act must account for the different groups affected.  This 
Section identifies these groups and explains the proposed statute’s 
treatment of them, as well as the motivation for this treatment. 
 
128 See supra note 62. 
129 Cf. Affordable Care Act sec. 1501(b), § 5000A(e), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e) (West 
Supp. 2011) (listing individuals who cannot afford health coverage as the first exempt 
group). 
130 In some cases, willfully uninsured claimants pay the equivalent of a bronze plan 
premium and simply refuse the coverage that comes with it.  See supra text accompany-
ing notes 82-83. 
131 Though many state statutes pertaining to collateral sources address both tort 
and contract actions, this statute is meant to address only personal injury actions. 
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1.  The Willfully Uninsured Claimant 
If the purpose of the collateral source rule, and of tort law more 
generally, is to proportionately allocate the costs of harm to the indi-
viduals who cause it, then it is reasonable to hold a claimant partially 
responsible for shirking his responsibility to mitigate the costs of this 
harm by purchasing insurance.  The Affordable Care Act fundamen-
tally changed the incentives surrounding the purchase of medical in-
surance by imposing the individual mandate, and the collateral source 
rule should be updated to align with an individual’s new responsibility 
to obtain coverage. 
For this reason, the model statute proposed here would introduce 
a new damages rule to supplement the changes proposed to the col-
lateral source rule below.  The new statute would require the subtrac-
tion of the amount of medical costs that would have been covered un-
der a bronze plan, the minimum coverage plan acceptable under the 
Affordable Care Act, from damages awarded to willfully uninsured 
plaintiffs.  The bronze plan is the only justifiable plan to use as a meas-
ure because using a more expensive plan would punish uninsured 
plaintiffs for not obtaining coverage they were not obligated to buy.  
To protect willfully uninsured claimants from the reduction of damag-
es that would not have been covered under a bronze plan, the model 
statute incorporates a version of the make-whole rule.  This proposed 
statute would ensure that the awards for willfully uninsured claimants 
are not unjustly reduced and that these claimants do not unjustly bene-
fit from damages that should be covered by an insurance plan. 
2.  The Insured Claimant 
The Affordable Care Act’s passage has also weakened some of the 
justifications for upholding the collateral source rule for insured 
claimants.  Although there is still a deterrence justification for holding 
the tortfeasor responsible for the full cost of his harm, it now makes 
little sense to preserve a rule meant in part to protect or reward in-
sured claimants when obtaining insurance is mandatory.  In light of 
the proposal for reducing the awards of willfully uninsured claimants, 
it is only equitable that the damages rule for uninsured claimants be 
the same for insured claimants.  Therefore, under the model collat-
eral source rule proposed below, the court must reduce the insured 
claimant’s award post-verdict to reflect the amount paid by the collat-
eral source—except in the case of claimants with subrogation obliga-
tions.  For these claimants, no portion of the award subject to a subro-
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gation agreement may be reduced from the claimant’s award.  Fur-
thermore, because of the unique difficulties posed by subrogation,132 
the proposed rule contains both a make-whole provision and the op-
portunity for claimants subject to subrogation agreements to present 
evidence of this obligation to the jury.  The make-whole provision, in 
particular, is meant to ensure that the claimant is adequately compen-
sated.  In addition, the actual cost of collateral benefits—and not the 
reasonable cost of medical care—is deducted from the award, leaving 
room for the additional coverage of the insured claimant’s costs, since 
the jury will still be asked to award the reasonable cost of care.  The 
provisions for insured claimants reflect limitations on the damages 
portion of the collateral source rule that are currently in place in a 
majority of states.133 
3.  The Claimant Exempt from Purchasing Insurance 
Because the claimant exempt from purchasing insurance may 
have no other means of covering his medical costs, he is exempt from 
the provision in the proposed statute that reduces the award of a will-
fully uninsured plaintiff.  Like the claimant subject to a subrogation 
agreement, the exempt claimant should also have the option to share 
this fact with the jury, if he so chooses.  Since the uninsured claimant 
receives no collateral benefits, no reductions are made from his award. 
B.  Model Statute for the Introduction of Evidence  
Pertaining to Collateral Sources 
(a) In all tort actions for which economic damages for personal 
injury are claimed and are legally recoverable, information pertaining 
to whether the claimant has been or will be paid or reimbursed by a 
third party is not admissible, except that information relating to the 
payment of collateral benefits or the lack thereof may be introduced 
by the claimant if: 
(1)  the court determines that the claimant has an obligation 
to repay the expenses which have been or will be paid or re-
imbursed; or 
(2) the court determines that the claimant is exempt from ob-
taining insurance under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d) or (e). 
 
132 See supra Section IV.D. 
133 See statutes cited supra notes 21-22. 
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(b) The trial judge shall deduct from the verdict the amount of 
nonsubrogated collateral benefit paid to the claimant by a third party, 
less the total amount determined to be paid, contributed, or forfeited 
by the claimant to obtain reimbursement or payment of medical or 
hospital expenses. 
(c) After the finder of fact has returned its verdict, the defendant 
may produce evidence that the claimant failed to obtain minimum es-
sential insurance coverage under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b), but was not 
exempt from purchasing insurance under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d) or 
(e).  If the court so finds, it shall reduce the damages to be awarded 
by the amount that would have been reimbursed to him by the lowest 
level of minimum essential coverage accepted under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18022(d)(1), “the bronze plan,” except that: 
(1)  this amount may be deducted only to the extent that the 
verdict exceeds the amount of the claimant’s damages that 
would not be covered by the bronze plan; and 
(2)  the claimant is not entitled to the costs of any penalty 
paid under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) for failure to obtain insur-
ance coverage. 
C.  Effect of the Model Statute 
This model statute may be criticized by those who argue that hold-
ing willfully uninsured claimants responsible for their failure to pur-
chase mandatory health insurance accomplishes neither the compen-
satory nor the deterrent function of tort law.  The rule offered above 
does not fully compensate the willfully uninsured claimant for his in-
jury, nor does it impose the full cost of harm on the tortfeasor. 
However, this model statute aims to achieve compensation and 
deterrence more broadly.  In failing to obtain the mandatory insur-
ance, the willfully uninsured claimant causes a loss to society by failing 
to take part in a system that promotes loss compensation at a low price 
to individuals.  In this sense, the willfully uninsured plaintiff is held 
responsible for the portion of the loss he could have covered, just as a 
claimant’s award can be deducted for comparative negligence.134  In 
this way, and by exempting uninsured plaintiffs who are not required 
to purchase health insurance under the Affordable Care Act, the pro-
 
134 See, e.g., Cockerline v. Menendez, 988 A.2d 575, 588 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010) (“[The] comparative fault system is intended to ensure ‘the distribution of 
loss in proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing that loss.’” (quoting 
Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 853 A.2d 940, 947 (N.J. 2004))). 
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posed statute attempts to achieve the equitable result.  This proposal 
would also affect settlement negotiations by lowering the willfully un-
insured claimant’s expectation of the damages he could receive from 
a trial. 
Similarly, a deterrence perspective can justify this revised rule.  
Now that obtaining insurance coverage is mandatory, this rule impos-
es costs on both parties at fault in a suit—the tortfeasor and the will-
fully uninsured claimant.  To ensure that the tortfeasor still pays a 
portion of the damages, the only costs imposed on the claimant are 
those that otherwise would have been covered by the lowest level in-
surance plan, and the successful claimant is guaranteed recovery of his 
other costs before his damages are reduced. 
Supporters of the common law collateral source rule may raise ar-
guments from the traditional debate:  that the common law rule pro-
tects insured claimants and that this particular statute undermines the 
deterrence function of the collateral source rule.  However, with the 
significant majority of Americans insured,135 the rule will not protect 
claimants from jury assumptions.  Collateral source rule supporters 
also may argue that a statute that reduces damages undermines the 
deterrence achieved from the tortfeasor’s payment of full damages.  
However, many states have already adopted this kind of reduction to 
combat rising insurance costs and the increased use of liability insur-
ance.136  The model statute attempts to maintain a level of deterrence 
by allowing insured claimants to continue to receive write-offs and en-
couraging subrogation.  In addition, the model statute’s primary 
aim—to allocate the costs of harm fairly in light of the Affordable 
Care Act—functions as a deterrent for those claimants who may oth-
erwise choose to ignore their obligation to purchase insurance. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the passage of the Affordable Care Act will not resolve 
the collateral source rule debate, it has the potential to galvanize 
states and the federal government to reevaluate their collateral source 
rule statutes by introducing a new factor to be considered in the de-
bate:  the willfully uninsured claimant.  By evaluating how the debate 
over the collateral source rule has changed, perhaps a new consensus 
can be achieved in terms of resolving some of the differences among 
states that have limited the rule.  The model statute presented here is 
 
135 See supra note 66. 
136 See supra note 21. 
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not the only solution to the issue; however, it strives to achieve an eq-
uitable result in a society in which insurance coverage is mandated.  A 
full repeal of the rule will not achieve this result, but an evaluation of 
which claimants the rule should be protecting may allow for its proper 
limitation and a more standardized approach to the way in which the 
rule is used across the states. 
 
